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Abstract This study compared the effects of three
experimental conditions on sleep: regret (negative emo-
tion condition), pride (positive emotion condition), and
description of a typical working day (emotionally neutral
condition). A sample of 176 undergraduate students
received sealed envelopes to be opened prior to sleep in
the evening. The evening envelope contained instructions
to describe either ‘‘your most burdensome regret,’’ ‘‘the
action you are most proud of,’’ or, in a neutral and objec-
tive manner, a typical day during the working week. The
morning envelope contained instructions to rate total wake
time, sleep-onset latency, and total sleep time the preceding
night. Additional questionnaires on insomnia severity, trait
anxiety, and counterfactual processing were completed in a
larger data collection session. Analyses revealed that in
participants with habitually high levels of regret, focusing
on regret prior to sleep significantly delayed sleep onset in
comparison with the neutral condition. This effect was
independent of preexisting levels of insomnia severity and
trait anxiety. In contrast, focusing on pride prior to sleep
did not significantly alter sleep, as compared with the
neutral condition. These findings suggest that emotional
arousal may contribute to sleep disturbance and should be
clearly distinguished from cognitive arousal in the etiology
of insomnia.
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Insomnia is a highly prevalent health problem. In a recent poll
of the National Sleep Foundation, 59 % of the respondents
reported experiencing at least one symptom of insomnia every
night or almost every night (National Sleep Foundation 2012).
The individual and societal impact of sleep disturbance is size-
able: The consequences of insufficient sleep include impaired
concentration and memory, heightened risk of accidents,
increased risk of medical problems such as cardiovascular dis-
ease, more frequent use of healthcare institutions, and aug-
mented absenteeism at the workplace (Mai and Buysse 2008).
Over the last few decades, cognitive-behavioral approa-
ches have significantly contributed to the etiology and treat-
ment of insomnia (Edinger and Means 2005; Harvey et al.
2005; Morin et al. 2006). According to these approaches,
excessive cognitive activity at bedtime, also termed ‘‘cogni-
tive arousal,’’ represents a key impediment to falling asleep
(Espie 2007; Harvey 2002). Although sleep-interfering cog-
nitive arousal has long been postulated to be laden with neg-
ative affect (Espie 2002; Harvey 2002), the importance of
empirically investigating the precise nature of affective pro-
cesses in insomnia has only recently been recognized (e.g.,
Baglioni et al. 2010; Schmidt et al. 2011). Emerging evidence
suggests that while specific negative affective states may
disturb sleep (e.g., anger; Stoia-Caraballo et al. 2008), specific
positive affective states may promote sleep (e.g., gratitude;
Wood et al. 2009). However, intense positive affective states
may also interfere with sleep (e.g., romantic love; Brand et al.
2007), suggesting that the level of arousal rather than the
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valence of affective states determines the consequences on
sleep.
Given that bedtime may often be the first quiet period in
the course of the day available to review one’s own
behavior, we proposed that this time window might be
particularly suitable for the emergence of feelings of regret,
shame, and guilt, which, in turn, might interfere with the
process of falling asleep (Schmidt and Van der Linden
2009). Regret, shame, and guilt are generally conceived of
as counterfactual emotions because they involve compar-
ing the facts of reality with counterfactual imaginations of
what might have been (e.g., ‘‘If I had [not] done X, I would
be in a better situation now’’; e.g., Zeelenberg and Pieters
2007). In accord with this assumption, we previously found
that university students reported often experiencing coun-
terfactual thoughts and emotions at bedtime and that the
frequency of such thoughts and emotions was linked to
insomnia severity (Schmidt and Van der Linden 2009).
Moreover, we found that students scoring high on impul-
sive urgency were particularly likely to engage in coun-
terfactual processing at bedtime, suggesting that they
mentally replay and reconsider their rash daytime behavior
as they try to fall asleep. Impulsive urgency can be defined
as the tendency to act rashly, especially under conditions of
negative affect (Whiteside and Lynam 2001).
More recently, we essentially replicated these findings
in a sample of elderly people, whose age ranged from 51 to
98 years (Schmidt et al. 2011). The pattern of their
responses clearly suggested daytime variation in the
experience of regrets: While regret frequency remained at
comparatively low levels for most of the waking hours, a
sharp rise occurred in the evening after going to bed.
Furthermore, we found that the nocturnal rise of regrets
substantially contributed to insomnia severity indepen-
dently of other well-known risk factors for late-life sleep
disturbance, such as depression, sleep-interfering medical
conditions, or medications (for a discussion of these risk
factors, see Mai and Buysse 2008). Finally, as with young
university students, older adults scoring high on impulsive
urgency were especially likely to experience regrets at
bedtime and were therefore at a higher risk for sleep
disturbances.
By investigating the associations between individual
differences in regret anticipation and insomnia, we gath-
ered further evidence for a role of this emotion in sleep
disturbance (Schmidt and Van der Linden 2011). We
hypothesized that individuals who have difficulties antic-
ipating potential future regrets are at an increased risk of
blindly running into situations or adopting behaviors that
are prone to evoke regrets. As a consequence, they should
experience more actual regrets and related counterfactual
emotions, which have been shown to interfere with sleep
(Schmidt and Van der Linden 2009; Schmidt et al. 2011).
To test these ideas, we developed the Regret Anticipation
Failures Scale and administered it, along with other ques-
tionnaires, to university students. In line with our predic-
tions, results showed that regret anticipation failures in the
course of the day were positively associated with the fre-
quency of regret-related counterfactual thoughts and emo-
tions at bedtime, and that the latter mediated the effect of
regret anticipation failures on self-rated insomnia severity
(Schmidt and Van der Linden 2011).
A limitation of our previous investigations into the links
between counterfactual emotions and sleep disturbance
resides in their correlational nature, which precludes causal
inferences. To overcome this limitation, we experimentally
manipulated regret experiences prior to sleep in the present
study. Specifically, our experimental design compared
sleep in three conditions: (a) a condition in which we
activated regret experiences; (b) a condition in which we
activated pride experiences; and (c) a control condition in
which participants were asked to describe a working day in
a neutral and objective manner. On the basis of our pre-
vious correlational findings, we hypothesized that activa-
tion of preexisting regret in the evening would impair sleep
the following night (as assessed by sleep-onset latency,
total wake time in bed, and total sleep time), as compared
with the neutral condition. In light of emerging evidence
that positive affective states may have beneficial effects on
sleep (Emmons and McCullough 2003, Study 3; Wood
et al. 2009), we further hypothesized that activation of
pride in the evening might facilitate sleep the following
night, as compared with the neutral condition.
In view of previously established relations between
regret and anxiety (e.g., Roese et al. 2009), as well as
between anxiety and insomnia (e.g., Mitchell et al. 2012),
we administered an anxiety questionnaire to control for this
potential confounding variable. Furthermore, given that our
experimental design involved activation of preexisting
regret experiences, we included a questionnaire on regret-
related counterfactual processing in order to differentiate
between people with high and low levels of regrets. People
may indeed differ in terms of regret-evoking experiences
and also in terms of their propensity for counterfactual
processing (Sanna et al. 2006). Finally, we used a sleep
questionnaire to assess whether activation of regret and
pride experiences might impact sleep independently of
preexisting levels of sleep disturbance.
Method
Participants
One hundred eighty-two undergraduate students of psy-
chology participated in this study to fulfill a course
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requirement. Six participants were excluded from analyses
because they had not completed all sections of the ques-
tionnaires. The final sample thus comprised 176 partici-
pants, 155 women and 21 men, aged 17–45 (M = 20.94;
SD = 4.18).
Procedure
On the occasion of a larger data collection session for first-
year students in psychology, participants were asked to
complete two questionnaires, which are described in detail
below. They were assessed in groups of up to 40 people,
with questionnaires being administered on computers.
Upon completion of the questionnaires, participants were
handed two sealed envelopes and instructed to open the
‘‘evening envelope’’ just before going to bed and to open
the ‘‘morning envelope’’ upon awakening the next day. To
randomly assign the participants to the three experimental
conditions detailed below, the envelopes were handed to
them from a pile that contained the three corresponding
types of documents in alternating order, which was invis-
ible to both research assistants and participants. A similar
envelope method has previously been used in dream
research (e.g., Wegner et al. 2004).
The three different types of documents in the envelopes
corresponded to the following three experimental condi-
tions: the regret condition, the pride condition, and the
neutral condition. The evening document in the regret
condition instructed participants to ‘‘describe in detail on
the lines below the most burdensome regret in your mind.’’
It was further specified that ‘‘the regret can concern
something you have done or something you have not done’’
and that the regret ‘‘can refer to a recent or remote episode
of your life.’’ All instructions were printed at the top of an
A4 page, with lines covering the rest of the page for par-
ticipants’ reports.
The evening document in the pride condition instructed
participants to ‘‘describe in detail on the lines below the
action you are most proud of.’’ It was further specified that
‘‘the action can be recent or remote.’’ We specified in the
regret and pride conditions that the episode or action could
be ‘‘recent or remote’’ because research suggests that
intense regrets may refer to remote experiences (e.g., Roese
and Summerville 2005), whereas participants might expect
that the most recent episodes of regret are likely most
important. Thus, with this instruction, we intended to
widen the scope of memory search for regrets by providing
participants with a metacognitive frame of what to look for.
Finally, in the neutral control condition, the evening
document instructed participants to ‘‘describe below in a
neutral and objective manner a typical day during the
working week (Monday through Friday).’’ It was further
specified that ‘‘this day should be representative of a
habitual day.’’ This experimental condition was inspired by
the neutral condition in Emmons and McCullough (2003,
Study 1) but in contrast to these authors, we explicitly
mentioned in the instruction that the task was to describe a
typical working day in a ‘‘neutral and objective manner.’’
A qualitative analysis of the reports in the neutral condition
revealed that participants, in compliance with this
instruction, typically described their general working day
schedule without mentioning specific emotion-eliciting
events. The morning document, which was identical in all
three experimental conditions, asked participants to record
the time it took them to fall asleep (sleep-onset latency),
the amount of time they spent awake in bed during the
night (total wake time in bed), and the amount of sleep
obtained in total (total sleep time).
Questionnaires
Bedtime Counterfactual Processing Questionnaire (BCPQ)
To assess habitual levels of counterfactual thoughts and
emotions during the pre-sleep period as a control variable,
we used the BCPQ (Schmidt and Van der Linden 2009).
The questions are preceded by the following instruction:
‘‘When in bed in the evening, one sometimes reviews the
day that has just come to an end. Hereafter, please indicate
how often different kinds of thoughts occur to you as you
are trying to get to sleep.’’ In the present study, we used an
extended version of the original BCPQ that included three
new items (numbered 3, 6, and 9 hereafter) designed to
control for response bias effects (Schmidt et al. 2011).
These items assess pride-related experiences, thus quite the
contrary to feelings of regret, shame, and guilt.
The wording of the 10 items is as follows: (1) ‘‘After
going to bed, how often do you regret your behavior toward
others?’’; (2) ‘‘After going to bed, how often do you think:
‘If only I had made another choice!’’’; (3) ‘‘After going to
bed, how often do you feel proud of yourself when you
look back at all that you accomplished?’’; (4) ‘‘After going
to bed, how often do you feel guilty because you have the
impression of having done wrong to others?’’; (5) ‘‘After
going to bed, how often do you think: ‘If only I were more
prudent!’’’; (6) ‘‘After going to bed, how often do you
congratulate yourself for the way you treated other peo-
ple?’’; (7) ‘‘After going to bed, how often do you feel
ashamed of yourself because of your behavior?’’; (8)
‘‘After going to bed, how often do you imagine how you
would have liked to behave, but did not?’’; (9) ‘‘After going
to bed, how often do you feel happy with the way you
handled a conflict with other people?’’; and (10) ‘‘After
going to bed, how often do you feel preoccupied with the
consequences of your behavior toward others?’’ Answers
are given on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (almost
874 Cogn Ther Res (2013) 37:872–880
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never) to 4 (very often). The original BCPQ (without the
three control items) and the extended version have been
shown to capture a single dimension and to possess high
internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alpha ranging from
.81 to .87.
Insomnia Severity Index (ISI)
To evaluate levels of sleep impairment during the month
preceding the experiment, we used the French version of
the ISI (Blais et al. 1997). The ISI contains seven items that
are rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (not at
all) to 4 (extremely). Respondents are asked to evaluate the
following dimensions of insomnia: (a) severity of insomnia
during the past month (difficulty falling asleep, difficulty
staying asleep, problem waking up too early); (b) satisfac-
tion with current sleep patterns; (c) interference with day-
time functioning; (d) noticeability of impairment to
significant others; and (e) level of distress caused by the
sleep problem. Total scores range from 0 to 28, with higher
scores indicating higher perceived insomnia severity. The
French version of the ISI has been shown to possess good
internal consistency (a = .88) and to correlate strongly
(r = .67) with the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (Blais
et al. 1997; Buysse et al. 1989). Concurrent validity of the
ISI has also been demonstrated using other-administered
versions of this instrument, polysomnography, and car-
diovascular measures (Bastien et al. 2001; Schmidt et al.
2010).
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T)
To assess habitual levels of anxiety, we used the French
version of the STAI-T (Spielberger et al. 1993), which is a
20-item scale measuring anxiety as a trait. Respondents are
asked to indicate on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1
(almost never) to 4 (almost always) the degree to which
they endorse statements like ‘‘I feel nervous and restless.’’
The internal consistency of this scale has been shown to be
high across a variety of participant samples (range of
Cronbach’s a: .89–.92; Spielberger et al. 1993).
Quantitative Content Analysis
To explore the life domains that the participants’ reports in
the regret and pride conditions were drawn from, two
independent raters assigned the reports to the 12 domains
that Roese and Summerville (2005) distinguished in rela-
tion to regrets: career, community, education, parenting,
family, finance, friends, health, leisure, romance, spiritu-
ality, and the self. Interrater reliability for the codings was
95.0 %, with a Cohen’s kappa of .88 (p \ .001).
Results
Preliminary Analyses
For the three questionnaires that participants filled out
during a data collection session prior to the experiment,
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients, mean scores, and standard
deviations are provided in Table 1. The range of alpha
coefficients (.85–.93) indicates that the three questionnaires
possess excellent internal consistency. Participant charac-
teristics are shown in Table 2.
According to the norms for the ISI provided by Bastien
et al. (2001), 30.7 % of our participants did not show any
sign of clinically significant insomnia prior to the experi-
ment (score range [Bastien et al.] = 0–7), 44.9 % gave
evidence of subthreshold insomnia (range = 8–14), 22.7 %
could be considered as suffering from moderate clinical
insomnia (range = 15–21), and 1.7 % obtained scores
corresponding to severe clinical insomnia (range = 22–28).
Correlational Analyses
To explore the associations between the questionnaire-
based scores, we computed Pearson correlations, which are
displayed in Table 3. In accord with previous investiga-
tions (Schmidt and Van der Linden 2009; Schmidt et al.
2011), the frequency of counterfactual thoughts and emo-
tions at bedtime, as assessed by the BCPQ, was positively
related to insomnia severity, as measured by the ISI
(r = .32, p \ .001). Again as expected, trait anxiety, as
indexed by the STAI-T, was positively related both to the
frequency of counterfactual thoughts and emotions at
bedtime (r = .59, p \ .001) and to insomnia severity
(r = .38, p \ .001). Trait anxiety was also positively
Table 1 Cronbach’s Alpha Coefficients, Means, and Standard
Deviations for the Questionnaire Scores
Variables a M SD
BCPQ total score .89 10.78 6.11
ISI total score .85 10.40 5.46
STAI-T total score .93 45.47 11.07
BCPQ Bedtime Counterfactual Processing Questionnaire, ISI
Insomnia Severity Index, STAI-T Stait-Trait Anxiety Inventory
Table 2 Participant characteristics by experimental condition
Experimental condition Mean age SD Range
Regret (n = 63) 20.71 3.87 17–45
Pride (n = 59) 21.34 4.42 17–37
Neutral (n = 54) 20.78 4.32 17–42
Cogn Ther Res (2013) 37:872–880 875
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related to sleep-onset latency (r = .27, p \ .001) and,
marginally, to total wake time in bed (r = .13, p = .104),
whereas it was negatively related to total sleep time (r =
-.18, p = .021).
Insomnia severity was related in the expected directions
to the three self-report measures of sleep the night fol-
lowing the experimental manipulation: sleep-onset latency
(r = .27, p \ .001), total wake time in bed (r = .18,
p = .021), and total sleep time (r = -.29, p \ .001). The
three latter correlations indicate that sleep disturbance
during the preceding month was associated with sleep
quantity during the experimental night. In view of these
associations and the earlier described associations between
trait anxiety and sleep during the experimental night,
supplemental analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with
insomnia severity and trait anxiety as covariates were
performed in order to detect whether the experimental
manipulation affected sleep independently of preexisting
levels of sleep disturbance and anxiety (see below).
ANOVAs
In order to examine whether the three randomly created
groups (regret, pride, and neutral conditions) differed on
any of the variables that were assessed prior to the exper-
iment, we computed ANOVAs with experimental condi-
tion as the between-subjects factor and the total scores of
the three questionnaires (BCPQ, ISI, and STAI) as
dependent variables. Results indicated that there were no
significant differences between the three experimental
conditions in terms of habitual levels of counterfactual
thoughts and emotions at bedtime, F(2, 173) = .27,
p = .76; insomnia severity, F(2, 173) = .054, p = .95; or
trait anxiety, F(2, 173) = .13, p = .88.
To investigate the effects of the experimental manipu-
lation on sleep, we computed three ANOVAs with exper-
imental condition as the between-subjects factor and sleep
latency, total wake time in bed, and total sleep time as
dependent variables. Variable values at more than two
standard deviations from the respective means were con-
sidered as outliers and removed from the analyses. Results
indicated that there were no significant differences between
the three experimental conditions in terms of sleep-onset
latency, F(2, 168) = 1.41, p = .25 (regret: M = 21.51,
SD = 17.24; pride: M = 18.02, SD = 12.68; neutral:
M = 17.42, SD = 11.82); total wake time in bed, F(2,
169) = .44, p = .65 (regret: M = 33.90, SD = 42.62;
pride: M = 37.84, SD = 36.68; neutral: M = 31.27, SD =
30.04); or total sleep time, F(2, 175) = .48, p = .62
(regret: M = 444.70, SD = 78.06; pride: M = 448.31,
SD = 91.53; neutral: M = 463.37, SD = 86.51).
Given that in the regret condition we activated regrets
that participants had prior to the experiment, we conducted
complementary analyses to determine whether the effect of
the experimental manipulation might depend on preexist-
ing levels of regrets at bedtime. Specifically, we performed
a median split on the frequency of counterfactual thoughts
and emotions at bedtime as assessed by the BCPQ. We then
computed another series of ANOVAs with experimental
condition as the between-subjects factor and sleep latency,
total wake time in bed, and total sleep time as dependent
variables.
For sleep-onset latency, results did not show any sig-
nificant difference between the three experimental condi-
tions in the group of participants with habitually low levels
of counterfactual thoughts and emotions at bedtime, F(2,
87) = .41, p = .66. In the group with habitually high levels
of counterfactual thoughts and emotions at bedtime, in
contrast, results revealed a significant difference between
the three experimental conditions, F(2, 78) = 3.32, p =
.041. For total wake time in bed, results did not indicate any
significant difference between the three experimental con-
ditions in the group of participants with high levels of
counterfactual thoughts and emotions at bedtime, F(2,
80) = .62, p = .54, or in the group with low levels, F(2,
86) = 1.10, p = .34. Likewise, for total sleep time, there
was no significant difference between the three experi-
mental conditions in the high-level, F(2, 82) = 1.96,
p = .15, or the low-level group, F(2, 90) = 1.05, p = .35.
In order to examine whether the effect of experimental
condition on sleep-onset latency in the high-level group
was independent of trait anxiety and preexisting sleep
disturbance, we conducted an analysis of covariance with
experimental condition as the between-subjects factor and
with STAI and ISI total scores as covariates. Results
indicated a significant effect for experimental condition,
F(2, 76) = 3.22, p = .045; trait anxiety, F(1, 76) = 6.05,
Table 3 Pearson correlations between questionnaire scores
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 BCPQ total
score
1
2 ISI total
score
.32*** 1
3 STAI-T total
score
.59*** .38*** 1
4 SOL .20** .27*** .27*** 1
5 TWT .13 .18* .13 .30*** 1
6 TST -.14 -.29*** -.18* -.11 -.19* 1
BCPQ Bedtime Counterfactual Processing Questionnaire, ISI Insomnia
Severity Index, STAI-T State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, SOL sleep-onset latency,
TWT total wake time in bed, TST total sleep time
*** Significant at the .001 level, two-tailed; ** significant at the .01 level, two-
tailed; * significant at the .05 level, two-tailed
876 Cogn Ther Res (2013) 37:872–880
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p = .016; and insomnia severity, F(1, 76) = 5.21,
p = .025. These findings indicate that the experimental
manipulation affected sleep-onset latency over and above
the expected effects of trait anxiety and preexisting sleep
disturbance. Follow-up t-tests showed that sleep-onset
latency was significantly longer in the regret condition as
compared with the neutral condition, t(51) = 2.36, p = .02
(regret: M = 26.67, SD = 20.11; neutral: M = 16.54,
SD = 8.69). Sleep-onset latency in the pride condition
(M = 20.89, SD = 11.71) did not significantly differ from
latencies in the regret, t(52) = 1.54, p = .13 (M = 26.67,
SD = 20.11), and neutral conditions, t(53) = 1.31, p =
.20 (M = 16.54, SD = 8.69), respectively (see Fig. 1).
Quantitative Content Analysis
In descending order of frequency, participants’ reports in
the regret and pride conditions referred to the following life
domains: (1) education: 23.7 % (e.g., ‘‘I regret having
repeated my 4th year of college’’); (2) family: 14.5 % (e.g.,
‘‘I’m proud that I told my family, after all those years, that
I loved them’’); (3) self: 13.0 % (e.g., ‘‘I’m proud that I
could prove to myself that I was able to live on my own in
an apartment’’); (4) friends: 10.7 % (e.g., ‘‘I regret not
having told my friend how important he was for me before
he left’’); (5) leisure: 10.0 % (e.g., ‘‘I participated in the
European junior diving championships and I qualified for
the World championships [pride]’’); (6) romance: 10.0 %
(e.g., ‘‘My most burdensome regret is having lied to my
boyfriend, while he’s so important to me’’); (7) commu-
nity: 4.6 % (e.g., ‘‘I was able, with my host family, to help
homeless people by providing them with food and clothes
[pride]’’); (8) health: 3.0 % (e.g., ‘‘I had to fight a disease
and I’m proud not to have given in’’); (9) parenting: 3.0 %
(e.g., ‘‘The action I’m most proud of is to have given birth
to my son’’); (10) career: 2.2 % (e.g., ‘‘I’m proud to have
worked in the center all through the month of July’’); (11
and 12) finance and spirituality: one report (respectively: ‘‘I
regret having spent all the money I was given for my
birthday’’; ‘‘I completed a missionary journey abroad
which lasted 4 months [pride]’’). A small number of
reports (3.8 %) could not be assigned to any of these cat-
egories for lack of precision.
Discussion
In this study, we examined whether focusing on regret in
the evening may impair sleep the following night, as
compared with focusing on pride or on a neutral working
day schedule. The main finding was that experimental
activation of regret in participants with habitually high
levels of counterfactual thoughts and emotions signifi-
cantly delayed sleep onset: It took participants in the regret
condition on average 26 min to fall asleep, whereas par-
ticipants in the neutral condition did so in only about
16 min. Of note, this effect was independent of preexisting
levels of anxiety and insomnia, suggesting that acute
feelings of regret may exacerbate sleep disturbance over
and above the well-established impact of habitual anxious
arousal (e.g., Mitchell et al. 2012). This experimental
evidence extends previous correlational data from a study
(Schmidt et al. 2011) suggesting that nocturnal regrets can
contribute to sleep difficulties independently of another
well-known risk factor for insomnia, namely, depression
(e.g., Taylor et al. 2005).
As outlined in the introduction, cognitive models of
insomnia assume that arousal plays a central role in sleep
disturbance and, in a further refinement, it has been pro-
posed to differentiate between cognitive, emotional, and
physiological arousal (e.g., Espie 2007; Harvey 2002).
A 
B 
Fig. 1 Mean duration of sleep-onset latency in minutes (y axis) for
the three experimental conditions (pride, neutral, regret): a Group of
participants with habitually high levels of presleep counterfactual
thoughts and emotions; b group of participants with habitually low
levels of presleep counterfactual thoughts and emotions. Error bars
represent respective standard errors
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Cognitive arousal refers to mental activation, which can
take the form of thoughts and images (Harvey 2000). Poor
sleepers typically complain of cognitive hyperarousal in
the form of intrusive thoughts, worry, and rumination (e.g.,
Harvey 2002), which can be subsumed under the term
repetitive thought (Watkins 2008). Emotional arousal
refers to the intensity of the emotional experience (e.g.,
Canli et al. 2000), for example, the intensity of feelings of
regret. Physiological arousal, finally, refers to the activa-
tion of the sympathetic nervous system, which may man-
ifest itself across different parameters, such as heart rate or
skin conductance level (e.g., Harvey 2002).
Regarding the emotion of regret, empirical evidence
from outside of insomnia research supports the distinction
between the dimensions of cognitive and emotional arou-
sal. For instance, Roese and colleagues (Roese et al. 2009)
found that both repetitive thought (cognitive arousal) and
regret (emotional arousal) correlated with depression.
However, when repetitive thought and regret were simul-
taneously used as predictors of depression in a multiple
regression, only regret emerged as a significant predictor,
suggesting that regret-related emotional arousal may con-
tribute to mental health problems independently of cogni-
tive arousal. Taken together, the findings of Roese and
colleagues and of the present study suggest that in the
context of insomnia, emotional arousal should be consid-
ered as an etiological factor that is partly independent of
cognitive arousal.
The question of why regrets delayed sleep onset only in
participants with habitually high levels of counterfactual
thoughts and emotions may essentially be explained by the
nature of our experimental manipulation. Specifically, we
did not induce new regrets prior to sleep, for example, by
having participants play a game and then ruminate on
missed monetary gains, but we activated preexisting regrets
by instructing participants to describe their ‘‘most bur-
densome regret.’’ Thus, the success of our manipulation
hinged on the existence of noteworthy regrets, in the
absence of which there was little or nothing to activate.
Although activation of regret delayed sleep onset in par-
ticipants with preexisting regrets, it did not have any effect
on the other two sleep parameters. As hypothesized, total
wake time in bed was longer and total sleep time shorter in
the regret condition as compared with the neutral condition,
but these differences did not reach statistical significance. In
view of the temporal proximity between the experimental
manipulation just prior to sleep and sleep-onset latency, a
comparatively stronger effect for this sleep parameter might
have been expected. However, additional factors may
account for the disparity of effects on the three sleep
parameters. Given that processes of emotion regulation
occur during sleep (e.g., Walker and van der Helm 2009), it
is, for example, conceivable that the effects of acute regret
are down-regulated across the night. Alternatively, regret-
related processing may continue during sleep and manifest
itself in dreams (e.g., McNamara et al. 2002; Schmidt and
Van der Linden 2009), but such processing may not elicit
enough arousal to interrupt sleep.
Regarding the presleep activation of pride, we did not find
any significant effect on the three sleep parameters. In view
of evidence suggesting that positive affective states, such as
gratitude, may have beneficial effects on sleep (Emmons and
McCullough 2003, Study 3; Wood et al. 2009), we expected
that activation of pride might facilitate sleep as compared
with the neutral condition. However, recent empirical find-
ings caution against too simplistic a view that would equate
positive affect with good sleep and negative affect with bad
sleep (for a detailed discussion, see Schmidt et al. 2011). For
instance, it has been found that happy mood induction in
individuals with interepisode bipolar disorder may delay
sleep onset, possibly because these individuals react to happy
mood with an activating focus on the pursuit of goals and
rewards (Talbot et al. 2009).
The absence of any sleep-promoting effect of the posi-
tive emotion of pride may similarly be explained on the
basis of arousal. In contrast to gratitude, which has been
shown to facilitate sleep (Emmons and McCullough 2003,
Study 3; Wood et al. 2009), pride seems to be more closely
associated with the pursuit of goals and reward (e.g.,
Carver et al. 2010), thereby possibly augmenting the level
of arousal. For example, some participants in the pride
condition described winning a competition in a sport they
were still practicing, which might have activated motiva-
tional processes geared toward future competitions, thereby
lifting arousal levels. This illustration highlights the
importance of analyzing affective states in terms of arousal
in order to clarify their potential impact on sleep.
Regarding treatment implications, it is of note that in
response to regret, people often use maladaptive emotion
regulation strategies, such as self-attacking, which exac-
erbate emotional arousal and sleep disturbance (e.g.,
Schmidt et al. 2011). Given that fostering self-compassion
and self-forgiveness have been shown to counteract
adverse effects of self-attacking (e.g., Gilbert and Procter
2006; Ingersoll-Dayton and Krause 2005), a promising line
for future research will be to evaluate these emotion reg-
ulation strategies in the context of insomnia.
To provide further guidelines for future research, three
limitations of the current study should be mentioned. First,
sleep was evaluated using self-reports. Future investiga-
tions might include objective measures, such as actigraphy
(e.g., Vallie`res and Morin 2003), to complement and cor-
roborate subjective self-report data. Second, participants in
the present study were undergraduates. An interesting
avenue for future research will be to explore whether
similar effects of regret activation on sleep may be
878 Cogn Ther Res (2013) 37:872–880
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observed in samples of the general population and in older
adults. Indeed, the existing literature on regrets and sleep
suggests that the intensity of regrets is liable to increase
across the life span and to have increasingly stronger
effects on sleep because opportunities to undo regrets
generally decline with age (Schmidt et al. 2011; Wrosch
et al. 2005). A final limitation of this study is that partic-
ipants’ compliance with the instructions to complete the
documents just before going to bed in the evening and upon
awakening the next morning was not controlled for. The
computer-based collection of self-reports, for example, via
cell phones, may represent a useful method to ensure
compliance in future experiments.
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